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NOTES
Amortization: A Means of Eliminating the
Nonconforming Use in Ohio
RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION swelled the early 20th century cities
to a degree theretofore unknown. Home, commercial, and
industrial construction increased to meet the needs of increasing
population. Implicit in uncontrolled development were dangers
to the health and property of the cities' inhabitants and, in response,
zoning was developed to meet the challenge.1
Zoning ordinances were passed to control future land use.
Early planners contemplated the passage of ordinances to eliminate
existing structures which did not conform to zoning schemes, but
were faced with strong economic and political opposition. With the
constitutionality of zoning itself doubtful until Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,3 initiators of the zoning movement were nat-
urally reluctant to seek passage of acts to which severe objections
could be raised. Hence, early legislation treated lightly or neg-
In the landmark decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), the Court recognized that "[w]ith the great increase and concentration of pop-
ulation, problems have developed ... which require, and will continue to require, addi-
tional restrictions in respect to the use and occupation of private lands in urban commu-
nities." Id. at 386-87. It went on to hold that comprehensive zoning was a constitutional
exercise of the State's police power in that:
The segregation of industries commercial pursuits and dwellings to particular
districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to
the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the community. The estab-
lishment of such ...zones may, among other things, prevent congestion of
population, secure quiet residence districts, expedite local transportation, and
facilitate the suppression of disorder, the extinguishment of fires and the en-
forcement of traffic and sanitary regulations. The danger of fire ... and risk
of contagion are often lessened by the exclusion of stores and factories from
areas devoted to residences, and, in consequence, the safety and health of the
community may be promoted. Id. at 392.
In Ohio, the community's right to zone was established in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio
St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925) wherein the court noted that:
Under the police power society may restrict the use of property without mak-
ing compensation therefore, if the restriction be reasonably necessary for the
preservation of the public health, morals or safety. This is so, because all
property within the state is held subject to the implied condition that it will
be so used as not to injure the equal right of others to the use and benefit of
their own property. Id. at 637-38, 149 N.E. at 33.
For a review of the history of zoning in Ohio see McCarthy, The Legal Background
of Zoning in Ohio, 23 OHIO B. ASS'N REP. 563 (1950).
2 See E. BASSET, ZONING 26-27, 113 (2d ed. 1940).
3272 U.S. 365 (1926).
NONCONFORMING USE
lected entirely the nonconforming use.4 Legislators consoled them-
selves with the thought that, in time, the nonconforming use would
atrophy and disappear.5 It has not.
Today, the nonconforming use is one of the most difficult prob-
lems faced by municipalities in their attempts at orderly, efficient
administration of zoning regulations.6 Theoretically, zoning pro-
motes the general welfare by physically separating various incom-
patible uses of the available land to ensure that it is used most
advantageously. Uniformity is sought within each division and
consequently, a deviation from this uniformity, in the form of a
nonconforming use, is necessarily contrary to the public welfare.7
In addition, nonconformities may reduce neighboring property
values, as for example, where a nonconforming use bordering on
nuisance makes an entire area undesirable for residential use.' Fi-
nally, the nonconformity may demand municipal services not re-
quired by adjoining land uses and may simultaneously reduce the
tax basis of other property, thus forcing the municipality to shoulder
an increased financial burden.9
In Ohio, attempts to terminate the nonconforming use have
been conspicuously unsuccessful.'" Traditional methods of control
4 A nonconforming use is generally defined as a building, structure, or use of land
that is lawfully in existence on the effective date of a zoning ordinance or amendment
prohibiting such use, but which, nevertheless continues unaffected by such ordinance or
amendment thereto. E. YOKELY, ZONNG LAw AND PRACriCE § 148 (2d ed. 1953).
The preexisting nonconforming use is to be distinguished from a nonconforming use
which is created by a zoning board when such board grants a variance from the require-
ments of the local zoning law. A variance presents no problem as it depends upon the
board for continued existence, see State ex. rel. 12501 Superior Corp. v. East Cleveland,
81 Ohio L. Abs. 177 (Ct. App. 1959), and the present discussion is confined to those
nonconforming uses which antedate the zoning law.
5 Problems faced by early city planners are extensively discussed in Young, City
Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 MiNI. L. REV. 593 (1925).
6One observer has urgently remarked that: "Until some method is devised to per-
manently eliminate the nonconforming use from our cities and towns, effective city
planning cannot be achieved." Hertz, Non-Conforming Uses: Problems and Methods
of Elimination, 33 DIcTA 93 (1956). See also Anderson, The Nonconforming Use -
A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 214 (1959); Note, Amortization
of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 U. Cmr. L. REv. 477 (1942).
7 Graham, Legislative Techniques for Amortization of the Non Conforming Use:
A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 435 (1966).
8 Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, and Structures by
Amortization - Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 4 (1963-64).
9Id. at 4.
10 In response to a questionnaire prepared by this writer, city planners in Ohio mu-
nicipalities of over 500,000 population responded that nonconforming uses continue
to be a problem despite efforts to eliminate them and that "thousands" of nonconform-
ing uses exist in some Ohio cities. Data on prevalence of nonconforming uses is pro-
vided in Note, supra note 6, at 479.
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have succumbed to the resilience of the nonconformity while the
legality of alternative processes remains clouded." Amortization, "
the most attractive of the alternatives, could ensure elimination of
the nonconforming use, but is impeded by statutory limitation and
constitutional problems of due process and retroactivity. 3
This Note briefly traces the means that have been employed
in Ohio to terminate the nonconforming use of land and sets forth
the inherent limitations of these attempts. The problems involved
in gaining judicial approval for amortization are raised and an-
swered. Judicially determinative factors in a "reasonable" amorti-
zation ordinance are examined, and finally, the type of provision
which would both satisfy constitutional due process requirements
and do least violence to traditional notions of property rights is
surveyed.
I. OHIO ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE
NONCONFORMING USE
A. The Nuisance Approach
It is well settled that if a nonconforming use constitutes a nui-
sance it may be enjoined.' 4  Hence, although commenced under a
11 A list of the means of terminating nonconforming uses that have been proposed
can be found in Comment, The Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. REV.
685.
12 Amortization is the compulsory termination of a nonconforming use at the ex-
piration of a specified time. Katarincic, supra note 8, at 5. For a discussion of the
mechanics of amortization see text accompanying notes 41-44 infra. See generally Fell,
Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 24 MD. L. REV. 323 (1964); Graham, supra
note 7; Note, Principle of Retroactivity and Amortization of the Non-Conforming Use
- A Paradox in Property Law, 4 VILL. L. REv. 416 (1959); Note, supra note 6.
13 See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
14 It is equally well settled that a municipality may legislatively declare that certain
uses of land are public nuisances which may then be prohibited by ordinance. Hada-
check v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). In the Hadacheck case, petitioner was con-
victed for operating a brickyard in violation of a zoning ordinance. There was evidence
that the operation produced dust, fumes, gases, and smoke which interfered with the
habitability of the surrounding neighborhood. The Supreme Court held that brick man-
ufacturing was not a nuisance per se, but that a municipality could still regulate it under
the police power. The Court broadly stated:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential pow-
ers of government, one that is the least limitable.... A vested interest cannot
be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining.... To so hold
... would fix a city forever in its primitive condition. There must be progress,
and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good
of the community. Id. at 410.
The holding and quoted language suggest that zoning requiring immediate termina-
tion of preexisting nonconforming uses would be constitutionally valid where the use
approaches nuisance status. Courts in jurisdictions other than Ohio have seized upon
this rationale to justify such ordinances. E.g., State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDon-
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municipal permit, a manufacturing use that produced noxious odors
has been terminated. 5 Likewise, a nonconforming railroad has
been required to operate at a noise level tolerable to the residents
of its district.'"
As a means of comprehensively eliminating the nonconformity,
the common law doctrine of nuisance is, at best, ineffectual. The
most obvious weakness of such an approach is that it cannot be
argued with any degree of cogency that every nonconforming use
constitutes a nuisance." Also, a city's successful suit enjoins but
one offensive use in a nuisance action and is no guarantee that con-
formity with a city's zoning scheme will follow. The pressing
problem faced by most cities is the nonconforming use which does
not constitute a nuisance - this is the factual situation that appears
most frequently."8
However, some commentators believe that the potential of the
nuisance doctrine has not ,been fully exploited." They argue that
as contemporary research unveils a fuller understanding of nui-
sance factors in urban development and as city planners develop
performance standards against which such factors can be measured,
the nuisance doctrines will become effective in instances where
other methods of elimination are not. Thus, the nuisance doctrine,
inadequate of itself, may yet prove to be a valuable tool when used
ald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929). See also Standard
Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950),
wherein the court upheld an ordinance that required "that all locations or cities [sic)
within said parts of areas of the City now used for motor vehicle service stations shall be
discontinued ...." Id. at 412. The court rejected plaintiff's suit to enjoin enforcement
of the ordinance stating that plaintiff had acquired its property with "full knowledge
of the right of the City to modify its zoning ordinances so as to conform [with the] re-
quirements of a rapidly growing municipality." Id. It was "well established law" in
Florida that a municipality had the power to discontinue an existing property use. Id.
at 413.
Application of the nuisance rationale to statutes requiring cessation of existing non-
conforming uses raises problems. The doctrine of nuisance is already well established
and an application of the concept to the nonconforming use merely adds confusion to
both areas of the law. As a result, cases utilizing the concept of nuisance are those in
which the use causes "a tangible and material interference with the property or personal
well-being of others and [is] likely to constitute or to become a common law nuisance."
Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 CoLuM. L. REV. 457, 467 (1941). In addi-
tion, there is doubt concerning the validity of the nuisance rationale when the only pur-
pose of the ordinance is to achieve district uniformity. Id. at 467-70.
15 State ex rel. Ohio Hair Prods. v. Rendigs, 98 Ohio St. 251, 120 N.E. 836 (1918).
16 Hamilton v. Hausenbein, 103 Ohio App. 556, 139 N.E. 2d 459 (1956).
17 B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED S rATES 104 (1961).
18 Id.
1 Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW & CONTEmp.
PROB. 305, 312 (1955).
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in combination with other methods of eliminating the noncon-
forming use.
B. Control Approach
The approach generally taken by Ohio communities in their
attempts to eliminate the nonconforming use has been labeled the
"control approach."2  Accordingly, local ordinances recognize the
nonconforming use and allow it to exist but limit it so as to hasten
its demise.2 In theory, the limitations imposed upon the noncon-
formity so inhibit its continuation that it will, in the natural course
of events, eliminate itself. Generally, the owner of a nonconform-
ing use is prohibited from repairing, changing, or abandoning his
nonconforming use without losing his right to maintain it.22
(1) Repair. -Judicially approved" local zoning ordinances
commonly prohibit the owner of a nonconforming use from re-
storing it after it has been totally or partially destroyed. In gen-
eral, the right to repair is denied if the cost of such repair exceeds
50 percent of the value of the structure. Such limitations are con-
stitutional.' Of course, if ordinances do not provide to the contrary,
a nonconforming use may be rebuilt after it has been damaged.25
(2) Change. -Another means of control appearing in most
local zoning ordinances is a prohibition against change of a non-
conforming use to another use restricted in the district. Such a
change is not permitted even though the new use is quite similar
2 0 B. POOLEY, supra note 17, at 104.
2 1 See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 920 (1929).
2 2 See, e.g., LAKEWOOD, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1117.03 (1952):
Non-Conforming Uses
A non-conforming use shall not be extended [and] may not be reconstructed
to any extent exceeding . . . sixty percent of the assessed building unless
changed to a conforming use .... A non-conforming use if changed to a
conforming use may not be changed back to a non-conforming use.
23 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brizes v. De Pledge, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 463, 162 N.E.2d 234
(Ct. App. 1958), wherein the court rejected petitioner's request for a permit to rebuild
his flood-damaged cottage. It upheld an ordinance which prohibited reconstruction of
a nonconforming use "unless the building is made to conform to all regulations for
new buildings in the district in which it is located." Id. at 236. City council had ex-
ercised reasonable judgment in enacting the ordinance and the court would "not substi-
tute its judgment for the judgment of the legislative body .... ." Id. at 237. See also
State ex rel. Cataland v. Birk, 97 Ohio App. 299, 125 N.E.2d 748 (1953), where the
property owner voluntarily destroyed his nonconforming use and was prevented from
reconstructing it.
24 See State ex rel. Brizes v. De Pledge, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 463, 465, 162 N.E.2d 234,
236 (Ct. App. 1958).
2 5 Eskridge v. Sandusky, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 568, 136 N.E. 2d 465 (C.P. 1955).
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to the preceding one.2"
A change of use where the new use is of a higher classification
than the old (e.g., a change from business to residential use) is per-
mitted by some ordinances." If the new nonconforming use is
the same as that preceding, some ordinances authorize the change.
Others require permission of the zoning board of appeals.2"
(3) Abanlonment. -Ordinances which prevent a noncon-
forming use from continuing once it has been abandoned have
been upheld.20  Abandonment occurs when the property is used in
a fashion inconsistent with the claim of a nonconforming use."0
Whether or not an intent to abandon must be shown in order to
preclude reestablishment of the use is open to debate. In Francisco
v. City of Columbus3 ' appellee moved the majority of his equip-
ment from the site of his nonconforming use to a new factory ap-
proximately 1 mile away. Construing a statute that defined aban-
donment in terms of "removal of equipment," the court stated that
an intention to abandon need not be displayed and a fortiori, an
intention to continue abandonment need not be shown. Otherwise,
a zone could never be cleared of nonconformities, for if the owner
could show a mental reservation to return he would be allowed to
resume his nonconforming use. 2 However, a later case held that
a temporary cessation of a nonconforming use does not prevent re-
sumption unless an intent to abandon is shown.3" Respondent's sus-
pension of its nonconforming shale mining operation was due to
obsolescence of its equipment, not its own volition. An active in-
tent to abandon lacking, the lower court decree in favor of respond-
ent was affirmed.
2 6 See, e.g., Sussman v. City of Cleveland, 111 Ohio App. 18, 162 N.E.2d 225
(1959), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 164, 167 N.E.2d 927 (1960). The petitioner
had been selling secondhand building materials on her property located in an area sub-
sequently zoned for residential use. When she changed the use to the sale of auto parts,
also a nonconforming use, her request for a variance was denied by the zoning board of
appeals and the board's decision was upheld by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.
2 7 E.g., ordinance cited in Steudel v. Troberg, 76 Ohio App. 136, 63 N.E.2d 241
(1945).
2 8 E.g., ordinance cited in McVey v. Reichley, 105 Ohio App. 319, 152 N.E.2d 321
(1957).
29 Francisco v. City of Columbus, 13 Ohio Op. 404 (Ct. App. 1937), appeal dis-
missed, 134 Ohio St. 526, 18 N.E.2d 404 (1938).
3 0 See generally Annor., 18 A.L.R.2d 725 (1951).
3113 Ohio Op. 404 (Ct. App. 1937), appeal dismissed, 134 Ohio St. 526, 18
N.E.2d 404 (1938).
321d. at 408.
3 3 Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. City of Garfield Heights, 102 Ohio App. 69,
73-74, 136 N.E.2d 105, 111 (1956).
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(4) Criticism of the Control Approach. -Although some
variation of the control approach is probably utilized by every local
governing body engaged in zoning, it has not been successful in
eliminating the nonconforming use. 4 As one Ohio planner has
recently stated, "It is naive to believe that a nonconforming use
will, if regulated, disappear some time in the future. They just
hang on . . . ."" It seems evident that the premise underlying the
control approach is faulty; even when controlled, nonconforming
uses do not eliminate themselves.
The lack of success of the control approach can be attributed
to factors other than its basic premise. In many cases, strict pro-
visions have not been employed, and in others administrative de-
ficiencies have impeded enforcement of control provisions.36 In
addition, the existence of one nonconforming use is often cited by
other property owners as ground for permitting another variance.
If the variance is granted, nonconforming uses spread like a malig-
nancy, infecting the allegedly restricted district." Finally, the mo-
nopolistic position enjoyed by a nonconforming use is often of
considerable economic advantage to its owner, thus encouraging
and enabling him to carry on indefinitely. It is submitted that the
lack of success of the control approach indicates that a more effec-
tive solution must be sought.
II. AMORTIZATION: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE -
PROBLEMS IN ITS ADOPTION
Amortization has been enthusiastically hailed as the answer to
the nonconforming use problem and the best means to achieve
effective zoning administration.38 Amortization is the compulsory
termination of a nonconforming use at the expiration of a specified
period. 9 It is said that forced cessation of the use does not violate
the owner's due process rights because he is given a reasonable
period during which to recover or "amortize" his losses.4"
34 1 J. METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 75 (2d ed. 1955).
35 Interview with John A. Wilkes, Chief City Planner of Cleveland, in Cleveland,
Ohio, Feb. 19, 1968.
-6 A critical analysis of zoning administration is given in Babcock, The Unhappy
State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 509 (1959).
37 It has been maintained that zoning boards are less than provident in granting
variances. Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study
in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273, 324 (1962).
38 See Note, supra note 6.
39 Katarincic, supra note 8, at 5.
40 Other justifications for the termination of an existing use are that the owner of
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To illustrate the mechanics of amortization, suppose a person
legitimately owns and operates a warehouse in an area zoned for
commercial use. Suppose further that the building is of frame
construction and has an estimated remaining usable life of 20 years.
The value of the business is $30,000. Subsequently the area is
rezoned as a residential district. Now a nonconforming use, the
warehouse is incompatible with the residential dwellings surround-
ing it. Trucks, noise, and lights interrupt the tranquility of the
residential area while the warehouse building destroys the archi-
tectural congruity of the neighborhood.
Amortization would eliminate the problem by compelling ter-
mination of the use after a specified number of years. After an
"amortization period" the owner would have to give up the noncon-
forming use of his land.
The way in which the amortization period is determined
varies.41 Under some ordinances, the amortization period depends
upon the estimated remaining life of the structure to be amor-
tized.4" Thus, if the hypothetical warehouse were constructed of
cinder block rather than wood, its owner would have a longer pe-
riod to recover the losses stemming from compelled liquidation.
Conversely, if the warehouse were merely a temporary structure,
its estimated remaining life would be less than the hypothesized
20 years and the amortization period would correspondingly be
shorter. Under other ordinances, a single period is provided at the
end of which all nonconforming uses and structures must be ter-
minated.43 Still others are based solely upon the monetary value of
the nonconforming use." Thus, the hypothetical value of $30,000
would determine the period during which the nonconforming ware-
house was allowed to continue to exist. A more valuable ware-
house would command a longer amortization period while a shorter
period would suffice for a less valuable business.
Regardless of the basis for determining the length of the amor-
the nonconformity is probably in a monopolistic position which should produce extra-
ordinary gains and which will thus help offset any possible losses sustained from elimi-
nation, see City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 460, 274 P.2d 34, 44
(1954), and that the benefit to the public from elimination of the nonconforming use,
not a structure, will be greater than the detriment suffered by the owner. See People v.
Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 108, 106 N-E.2d 34, 35 (1962).
41 A discussion of the zoning ordinances of the 25 largest cities in the United States
is found in Katarincic, supra note 8, at 12-20.
4 2 See, e.g., Los Angeles, California ordinance, cited in Graham, supra note 7, at 450.
4 3 See, e.g.,Topeka, Kansas ordinance, cited in Graham, supra note 7, at 450.
44 See, e.g., Fernandina, Florida ordinance, cited in Graham, supra note 7, at 450.
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tization period, it is not to be doubted that amortization has advan-
tages over methods currently employed in Ohio to combat the
nonconforming use. Because it does not depend upon a separate
body of law for its efficacy, amortization avoids the confusion and
ineffectuality inherent in the nuisance approach. Unlike the con-
trol approach, amortization ensures termination of the nonconform-
ing use by requiring cessation at the end of a specified period.
Considering its advantages over Ohio's current attempt to deal
with the problem, one might expect a movement to adopt amortiza-
tion. Blocking such a movement is a doubt concerning its legality
under Ohio law.45 In Ohio, it is widely held that the owner of
property which is used for a lawful purpose prior to the enactment
of a restrictive ordinance acquires a vested right to continue the
nonconforming use;46 the use must be tolerated to the extent that
it did not conform at the time of passage of the ordinance.47 To
hold otherwise, it is said, would be unfair to the property owner
who, in reliance upon the previous zoning law, had made substan-
tial outlays to improve his property. Similarly, fear of subsequent
zoning changes would tend to discourage owners from improving
their property. Hence, the rule is that ordinances calling for the
termination of preexisting uses constitute the unconstitutional tak-
ing of property without due process of law.48
The vested rights theory is manifested in State enabling legis-
lation 9 and provided the basis for the controversial and oft-cited
4 5 In response to the question, "Why has not amortization been utilized as a means
of terminating the nonconforming use?", the Ohio city planner generally replies that
there is a legal question concerning its validity. Planners say they would welcome such
a provision if its legality were assured or if council would insist upon it. Questionnaire,
supra note 10.
46 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953);
Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. 2d 993 (1938).
4 7 See 2 A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING § 62-1 (3d ed. 1966).
48 Such a provisiotr has been labeled retroactive and unconstitutional, Gibson v.
Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960), or invalid because confiscatory. Kess-
ler v. Smith, 104 Ohio App. 213, 142 N.E.2d 231 (1957).
4 9 OHIO REV. CODE § 713.15 (Page Supp. 1966) purportedly limits the zoning
power of a municipality with respect to the nonconforming use:
The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or
premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance
or amendment thereto, may be continued, although such use does not conform
with the provisions of such ordinance or amendment, but if any such noncon-
forming use is voluntarily discontinued for two years or more, any future use
of the land shall be in conformity with sections 713.01 to 713.15, inclusive,
of the Revised Code. The legislative authority of a municipal corporation
shall provide in any zoning ordinance for the completion, restoration, recon-
struction, extension, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon such reason-
able terms as are set forth in the zoning ordinance. Id. (emphasis added).
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City of Akron v. Chapman5 ° decision which held that an amortiza-
tion provision violated the nonconforming owner's constitutional
right to due process.5 Any argument proposing amortization as a
solution to the nonconforming use problem in Ohio must thus meet
and overcome the arguments in the enabling statutes and the Chap-
man case.
A, The Enabling Legislation
According to section 713.15 of the Ohio Revised Code a use
"existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance...
may be continued, although such use does not conform with the
provisions of such ordinance .... "' Initially, it would seem that
the legislature has precluded local governing bodies from terminat-
ing the nonconforming use. However, if the word "may" is given
a permissive rather than directory interpretation, municipalities
would be able to require liquidation of the nonconforming use at
their discretion. A permissive interpretation is justifiable because
the legislature, had it intended to prevent municipalities from ter-
minating the nonconforming use, would have used the word "shalr"
instead of "may."53  Such a conclusion is bolstered by Ohio case
law as it is generally held that the word "may," when used in a
statute, grants discretion,54 whereas the word "shalf' is impera-
tive.515
Whether the demands of section 713.15 may be imposed upon charter municipalities
is doubtful. A municipality's power to zone is derived from the Ohio Constitution. A
municipality is free to adopt any measure which does not "conflict with general law."
Section 713.14 provides that "Sections 713.06 to 713.12, inclusive, of the Revised Code
do not repeal, reduce, or modify any power granted by law or charter to any municipal
corporation or the legislative authority thereof, or to impair or restrict the power of any
municipal corporation under Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution .... OHio REv.
CODE § 713.14 (Page Supp. 1960) (emphasis added). It has been held that this sec-
tion "yields unrestricted power to municipalities in respect to zoning if such powers are
granted by the municipal charter." Bauman v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St.
269, 270, 171 N.E. 336 (1930). Since the "general law" authorizes unrestricted ex-
ercise of powers granted by a municipal charter, there can be no "conflict with general
law," and an ordinance adopted according to charter provision would be valid. This
view is developed in Young, Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 W.
REs. L. REV. 681, 683 (1961).
50 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953), noted in 67 HARv. L. REv. 1283
(1954).
51 Id. at 389, 116 N.E.2d at 700.
52 Omo REV. CODE § 713.15 (Page Supp. 1966) (emphasis added).
53 It is possible that an ambiguity exists. Compare the way in which the statute is
categorized in B. POOLEY, supra note 17, at 119, -with that in Katarincic, supra note 8,
at 8.
54 E.g., Dennison v. Dennison, 165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E.2d 574 (1956).
55 E.g., State v. Cala, 35 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940). But cf. State ex. rel.
Dworken v. Court of Common Pleas, 131 Ohio St. 23, 1 N.E.2d 138 (1936).
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The above argument in favor of a municipality's power to ter-
minate the nonconforming use assumes that section 713.15 is ap-
plicable as a restriction on a municipality's zoning powers, but
syntactically circumvents the statute's effect. Circumvention of the
statute may be unnecessary because its applicability to zoning ordi-
nances is in fact open to serious question. Zoning is an exercise of
a community's police power56 and article XVIII, section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution provides that: "Municipalities shall have author-
ity to ... adopt and enforce.., such local police... regulations as
are not in conflict with" the general law. 7 A general law within
the meaning of this provision is a State police regulation which
prescribes a mode of conduct for all of the citizens of the State, re-
gardless of the municipality, township, or county wherein they re-
side.58 Hence, it is questionable whether section 713.15, which
merely limits a municipal corporation's powers to adopt and en-
force police regulations, is a "general law" within the purview of
the constitutional conflicts section. If it is not a "general law," its
implicit prohibition against amortization is invalid and municipali-
ties are free to establish their own rules regarding the termination
of nonconforming uses.
Whether or not section 713.15 is a "general law" within the
meaning of article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution has
not yet been decided. However, by analogy, the recent case of Vil-
lage of W. Jefferson v. Robinson" is authority for the proposition
that section 713.15 is not a "general law" and thus does not restrict
the municipal zoning power. In that case, the Supreme Court of
Ohio was called upon to construe two Ohio Revised Code sections"
which deal with a municipality's power to license transient dealers
and solicitors. These sections are similar to section 713.15 in that
they are laws limiting a municipality's police power.
Respondent, convicted for violating an ordinance prohibiting
peddlers from soliciting sales orders in private residences without
the occupant's invitation, argued that the ordinance was in conflict
with the Ohio Revised Code.6 Speaking for the court, Chief Jus-
tice Taft noted that even if there were a conflict, the validity of
56 See Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.2d
993 (1938).
5 OHIo CO NST. art. XVIII, § 3 (1912) (emphasis added).
58 Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
59 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
60 OO REV. CODE §§ 715.63-.64 (Page 1953).
61 1 Ohio St. 2d at 116, 205 N.E.2d at 385.
1052
NONCONFORMING USE
the ordinance depended upon whether the licensing statutes were
the general law of Ohio. He concluded that the statutes before
the court only limited the legislative power of municipal corpora-
tions and
the words "general laws" as set forth in section 3 of Article XVII
of the Ohio Constitution mean statutes setting forth police, sani-
tary or other similar regulations and not statutes which purport
only to grant or to limit the legislative powers of a municipal cor-
poration to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regu-
lations.62
The ordinance, not in conflict with "general" law, was valid and
judgment for respondent was reversed."
Both section 713.15 and the analogous sections before the Rob-
inson court were laws of general application limiting the police
power of a local governing body. Thus, it would seem safe to
predict that section 713.15 is not a "general law" within the mean-
ing of section 3 of article XVIII and thus does not prohibit the
use of amortization. This interpretation seems reasonable in light
of the purpose of the constitutional conflicts provision: to guarantee
uniform application of State police regulations, not to limit directly
the police power of a municipality.6"
B. The Ohio Case Law
Ohio judicial expression on amortization as a means of termi-
nating the nonconforming use is meager. The case of City of Ak-
ron v. Chapman" considered an ordinance which authorized city
council to require cessation of a nonconforming use after the use
had existed for a "reasonable" 'length of time. What was "rea-
sonable" was to be determined by the city council rather than by
judicial or administrative inquiry. The court held that such an
ordinance was unconstitutional as a violation of respondent's due
process rights.66
The Chapman decision should not be deemed to have settled
the question of the constitutionality of amortization in Ohio. The
facts of the case negate such a conclusion. Respondent had used
his property as a junkyard since 1916 and upon passage of the dis-
puted ordinance in 1922, the use became nonconforming. Twenty-
62 Id. at 118, 205 N.E.2d at 386 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 120, 205 N.E.2d at 388.
64 See City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
65 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
66Id. at 388, 116 NE.2d at 700.
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eight years later, in 1950, city council passed an ordinance aimed
solely at respondent's property, directing that the use terminate
within 1 year. There was no evidence that uses similar to respond-
ent's were treated in like manner and thus it is not surprising that
the fiat was struck down.
In addition, the rationale of the court is open to criticism. By
requiring termination of respondent's prior nonconforming use, the
ordinance was held to deprive him of property in violation of his
constitutional rights of due process.67 According to the court, a
property right is
not merely the ownership and possession of lands .. . but the un-
restricted right to their use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything
which destroys any of these elements . . . destroys the property
itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the
right to use is denied, the value of the property is annihilated and
ownership is rendered a barren right.68
If this definition were intended to relate to all property rights,
it would obviously be too broad as it would preclude all zoning.
One must conclude that the court's exposition was meant to apply
only to property rights in preexisting nonconforming uses. Be-
cause the rights involved in a nonconforming use are vested rights
they cannot be retroactively regulated by the zoning power without
depriving the owner of due process.6" However, every zoning reg-
ulation curtails vested rights by restricting prospective uses or se-
verely limiting continuation of existing uses. Hence, if the general
power to zone is admitted, it is conceptually incorrect to differen-
tiate between ordinary property rights and rights to maintain a
nonconforming use on the basis that the latter are vested.
The factor underlying the differentiation is economic rather
than conceptual."0 Prohibiting the continuation of an existing use
generally imposes a definite, measurable loss upon the individual
property owner, whereas the economic loss stemming from a pro-
spective restriction is generally less pronounced. Courts, like the
Chapman court, have transformed this generality into a rigid rule
of law; it is presumed that an existing property interest affected by
the particular ordinance is too substantial, when weighed against
67 Id.
68 Id.
6 9 See Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.
2d 993 (1938).
70 See Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 131-32, 163 N.E.2d 682, 686
(1959).
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the objectives to be achieved by enforcement, to justify termination
of the use. The owner of an existing nonconforming use is thus
given an unalterable vested right to continue it.
It is submitted that the presumption that the right to continue
a preexisting use is a vested right should be made rebuttable. The
investment in many nonconformities is not sufficiently substantial
to justify their continuation at the expense of the 'benefits accruing
to the community from an effective zoning plan. Whether a local
governing body should have the right to terminate the preexisting
nonconforming use should 'be determined by the reasonableness,
or lack thereof, of its amortization provision rather than the time
at which the individual improved his property.
IL. A REASONABLE AMORTIZATION PLAN:
JUDICIALLY DETERMINATIVE FACTORS
A judicial determination of the constitutionality of any zoning
regulation is arrived at by weighing the private loss suffered by the
property owner against the gain accruing to the public from the
regulation."m If the public interest outweighs the loss suffered by
the individual, the regulation is said to be a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the municipality and is allowed to stand. The
factors which a court peruses when striking the balance between
the public and private interests should provide the city planner
with an idea of what the reasonable amortization plan should em-
body. As Ohio has not yet passed favorably upon amortization, a
survey of court decisions in more progressive jurisdictions is helpful.
New York has experienced a judicial evolution leading to ap-
proval of amortization. In the case of People v. Miller7 the court
stripped the nonconforming use of the sacrosanctity previously ac-
corded it, stating that a zoning regulation requiring termination of
prior nonconforming uses would 'be sustained if the resulting loss
to the owners were relatively slight and insubstantial. 3  The Mil-
ler decision set the stage for Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 the
landmark amortization decision in New York. The city of Buffalo
attempted to eliminate Harbison's nonconforming cooperage busi-
ness by amending its zoning ordinance to require petitioners to
71 See Village of Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pritz v. Messer,
112 Ohio St 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
72304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
7aId. at 108, 106 N.E.2d at 35.
744 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
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discontinue their nonconforming use within 3 years. The court
declared that "reasonable termination periods based upon the amor-
tized life of the structure are not . . . unconstitutional" and "if a
zoning ordinance provides a sufficient period of permitted noncon-
formity, it may further provide that at the end of such period the
use must cease."" The court then remanded the case to the trial
court to determine the reasonableness of the ordinance in light of
the following: the nature of the surrounding neighborhood; the
value and condition of existing improvements; the proximity of a
relocation site and the costs of relocation; and other costs arising
from damages sustained by petitioners.!'
In California, the leading case dealing with amortization is City
of Los Angeles v. Gage.7" The ordinance in dispute required non-
conforming uses of land to be discontinued within a 5-year period.
Likewise, discontinuance was required of nonconforming commer-
cial and industrial uses of residence buildings in certain zones. In
its consideration of the provision as applied to respondent's use, the
court received evidence concerning the cost of relocation, the an-
nual gross revenue of the business, and the disturbance which the
use caused to its surroundings. The court recommended that the
allowed period of nonconformity be commensurate with the in-
vestment involved and the nature of the use; and, in cases of non-
conforming structures, on their "character, age and other relevant
factors."78
Any amortization plan to be adopted in Ohio should ideally
encompass the factors considered in the preceding decisions. At a
minimum, the scheme should consider unrecoverable costs, the
estimated remaining life of the nonconformity, and the degree
to which the nonconformity disrupts the municipality's zoning
scheme.79 The constitutionality of an ordinance which incorporates
these matters should be resolved in favor of the enacting munici-
pality rather than the nonconforming uses eliminated thereunder."
75 Id. at 561-62, 152 N.E.2d at 46-47, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
76 Id. at 564, 152 N.E.2d at 47-48, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
77 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
781d. at 459, 274 P.2d at 43.
79 It is the thesis of one writer that a determination of these three factors in relation
to each individual nonconformity represents the ultimate in the protection of an indi-
vidual property owner's rights to due process. Graham, Legislative Techniques for
Amortization of the Non Conforming Use: A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REV.
435, 451-52 (1966).
80 In order to fully protect the nonconforming owner's rights to due process, it has
been suggested that the presumption of validity commonly accorded legislative enact-
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IV. A PRoPosAL
The typical amortization ordinance categorizes nonconformities
by use and structure."' Nonconforming uses of land are distin-
guished from nonconforming buildings which could house a con-
forming use and those buildings which could not. Nonconforming
buildings are broken down into subcategories based upon type of
construction. The amortization period alloted a nonconforming
use varies according to the category to which the use relates.
Such provisions have been criticized for their lack of flexibil-
ity.82 Nonconforming buildings of the same construction are given
the same amortization period without regard to varying rates of
depredation. A more plastic provision would permit a thorough
appraisal of the environment in which the building is located, the
use to which it is put, and the quality of its construction. More-
over, strict categorization does not adequately reflect the economic
hardship that may accompany amortization of a going concern. In-
dividual hardship to the proprietor, and availability and viability
of the business should be thoroughly considered before amortiza-
tion. In addition, rigidly classified ordinances overlook the possi-
bility that there may be nonconforming uses that are beneficial to
the neighborhood. The neighborhood grocery represents a good
example of such a use. It may be that the corner grocery is a con-
venience and hence beneficial to the vicinity. Flexibility is needed
to provide for such situations.
The needed flexibility could be injected into the amortization
process through a hearing at which amortization periods are deter-
mined by a competent, expert board, specifically trained to exercise
ments should be reversed in the case of amortization ordinances. Note, Principle of
Retroactivity and Amortization of the Non-Conforming Use - A Paradox in Property
Law, 4 VILL. L Riv. 416, 428 (1959).
8 1 E.g., Chicago, Ill., Zoning Ordinance, Art. 6, cited in Katarincic, Elimination of
Non Conforming Uses, Buildings, and Structures by Amortization - Concept Versus
Law, 2 DUQUEsNE L. REv. 14-15 (1963) provides:
1. A non-conforming use of land shall be terminated within five (5) years;
2. A non-conforming use in a conforming structure or building shall be ter-
minated within eight (8) to (15) years;
3. Non-conforming buildings and structures shall be eliminated as follows:
a. Buildings or structures of a value of less than $5,000.00
(1) Under $2,000.00 - within five (5) years after passage of
the ordinance.
(2) Over $2,000.00, but under $5,000.00 within ten (10) years
after adoption.
b. All others, within twenty-five (25) to fifty (50) years depending
upon the nature of the construction.
82 Katarincic, supra note 81, at 42; Comment, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses:
Alternatives and Adjuncts to Amortization, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 354, 359 (1966).
19681 1057
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 19: 1042
their discretion in such matters.83 Accompanying such provision
should be an enumeration of factors which are relevant to the
board's decision. A hearing would enable the owner of a noncon-
forming use to present his case to the board. Thus, consideration
of all relevant factors would be furthered. In addition, the enu-
meration of factors would bar administrative discrimination and
abuse of discretion .by supplying criteria for judicial review.
The type of provision described above might read:
1. Hearing To Determine Amortization Period 4
The Planning Board shall conduct a hearing to determine the
amortization period of nonconforming uses to be subjected to
amortization. Notice of the date, time, and place of such hearing
will be given to the owner of the nonconforming use to be amor-
tized and to interested parties.
2. Factors Considered in Calculating Amortization Period"5
In determining the amortization period of a nonconforming
use, the Planning Board shall consider the nature of the use and its
effect upon its surroundings, the value and condition of existing
improvements, the possibility and cost of relocation, information
supplied by the owner of the nonconforming use and interested
parties thereof, and any other relevant factors.
Several factors in the above provision require comment. No-
tice of amortization is given the owner of a nonconforming use.
The typical amortization ordinance does not provide such notice.88
A reasonable amortization period allows an owner to plan for the
ultimate cessation of his use and thereby allows him to recoup any
losses arising from liquidation." If notice is not given, he has no
opportunity to prepare for liquidation. Therefore, courts should
83 A specially trained panel is advisable because the typical zoning board of appeals
does not have the expertise necessary to administer complex amortization problems. A
professional, by contrast, can assimilate the comprehensive plan of the city. In addi-
tion, he is generally insulated from the formal and informal pressure to which a board
of adjustment is often subjected. Katarincic, supra note 8, at 37.
84 Before a hearing is conducted, the nonconforming use must, of course, be located
and identified. Following the hearing, the termination date must be noted and subse-
quently enforced. It has been maintained that irresponsible administration of these tasks
will be the pitfall for amortization in certain municipalities. See F. HORACK & V. No-
LAN, LAND UsE CONTROLS 162-63 (1955).
85 It is to be noted that within the provision there is no requirement that all non-
conforming uses must be terminated. Thus the Board may, within its discretion, grant
continued existence to those nonconformities which are not injurious to the compre-
hensive plan. Under the typical amortization provision there is no such discretion. See
note 81 supra.
86 Amortization ordinances have been criticized for not providing notice. Comment,
supra note 82, at 362.
87 For a discussion of the justifications of amortization, see text accompanying note
45 supra.
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not consider the amortization period as commenced until notice
thereof has been given."
The suggested provision requires the board to take account of
the nature of the use and its effect upon its surroundings. The
compatibility, or lack thereof, of a nonconformity in relation to its
neighborhood should be estimated when fixing the amortization
period. If a nonconforming use is incompatible with its surround-
ings, it is reasonable to restrict its continued existence. If, on the
other hand, a nonconforming use is relatively consonant with its
neighborhood, it should be allowed a longer period of amortization
or even immunity from elimination.
The value of a use and cost of relocation are to 'be considered
in determining the amortization period. Although calculation of
the value of the use is problematical, a fair resolution may be ob-
tained by using fair market and costs. Market value should be
obtained from tax appraisals,8" while private estimates supplied by
the owner or interested parties can supplement the tax appraisal.
The cost of relocation can be likewise obtained by public and pri-
vate evaluation."0
Though problems of valuation are difficult, much more diffi-
cult is the composite review of the enumerated factors and final
determination of the amortization period. Administrative discre-
tion is the keynote of the proposed ordinance. Local officials are
granted discretion to fix the amortization period in each particular
case based upon the facts of the individual case. Administrative
discretion raises the possibility of abuse and arbitrariness. How-
ever, mitigating against such abuse is the presence of the owner of
the nonconformity at the hearing and the possibility of judicial re-
view. Without a grant of discretion, it is difficult to imagine an
ordinance sufficiently broad to allow adjustments and changes to
fit the circumstances of each particular case. Because it provides
for a tailored amortization period, the proposed ordinance is more
likely to satisfy constitutional requirements of due process than an
88 If notice must be given in condemnation cases in which compensation is awarded,
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), a fortiori, it should be given in
amortization cases.
89 In some municipalities tax appraisals are intentionally kept below market. The
tax rolls would be an unfair guide to market value in these instances. See Katarincic,
supra note 81, at 42.
90 It should be noted, however, that gathering information concerning the value of
a use and the cost of its location could be a burdensome administrative task. Means of
relieving such a burden are suggested in Graham, sapra note 79, at 454.
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ordinance with fixed and unchanging periods."'
V. CONCLUSION
The nonconforming use of land remains an obstacle to the at-
tainment of effective zoning administration in Ohio. Amortiza-
tion, a process which assures elimination of the problem, remains,
for all practical purposes, an untested weapon in the city planner's
arsenal. Reticence in deployment of the device stems from the
"legal questions" surrounding its successful adaptation. This Note
elucidates those issues and hopefully destroys any illusion as to
their insurmountability. Strong legal arguments support the va-
lidity of an amortization plan that adheres to the requirements of
due process as enunciated in more advanced jurisdictions. In this
connection, Dean Roscoe Pound's exhortation that the law must
remain stable while never standing still has particular relevance.
A well-conceived, well-drafted amortization provision need not
cause fear of the stamp of instability, or illegality, that movements
away from the status quo often entail. The provision proposed in
this Note furnishes a springboard of progressive thought for the
community interested in eliminating the nonconforming use.
FREDERIC C. BOWER
91 See 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 295, 297 (1955).
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